The unfinished journey from big data to patient outcomes

What the evidence on AI in heart disease actually supports

Field Guide

Bits in Bio Journal Club · August 2026 · npj Digital Medicine 2026;9:339
Tier 1
Technical validation
AUC, Dice, accuracy
Abundant
→
Tier 2
Care-pathway change
Process endpoints in RCTs
Thin but real
→
Tier 3
Patient outcomes
MACE, mortality, QoL
Largely absent

Why this topic

At the Mayo Clinic there is a network that can look at ten seconds of an ordinary heartbeat and tell you the pump is failing, quietly, years before the patient has thought to complain about anything, and while the cardiologist reading the same ten seconds sees nothing at all worth mentioning. That is a strange and rather wonderful thing to have built.

Heart disease kills more people than anything else on earth, and it has accordingly become one of the most crowded workshops in medical AI. Whatever anyone in this community happens to be building, some version of it arrives in their own field soon enough.

The club has spent the year circling a single question, approaching it from whichever direction the month's paper allowed: what has to be true of a body of data before anybody ought to act on it? Cardiology is a fine place to ask, for the uncomfortable reason that the quantity of work is enormous and the quantity that has changed a patient's life is not.

The two sessions side by side, with the question running underneath both
Purple blocks throughout carry insights from the BiB community, recorded on the day. Everything else comes from the paper or the primary sources behind it.

What kind of paper this is

It is a review, which is to say it gathers up other people's studies rather than running any of its own. Every number in it is therefore on loan, and a borrowed number arrives carrying whatever manners it learned at home.

A narrative review, more precisely, meaning the authors selected by judgement rather than by a declared search. What you have in your hands is a well-informed argument about a field, made by ten people who have read a great deal of it. That is a different object from a census, and worth knowing which you are holding.

Check the opening number. Deaths will reach 35.6 million by 2050, the paper says, and it is quite right: the figure comes from Chong and colleagues in Eur J Prev Cardiol 2025. What the same source also says, a little further down, is that once you account for a larger population and an older one, the death rate is expected to fall. The alarming half was quoted. Its companion was not. It is an easy thing to sail past on a first reading, which is rather the point.

Four jobs, four diseases

The authors could have sorted the field by algorithm, which is how computer scientists tend to prefer it. They sorted it instead by where along a patient's care the model actually stands, which is how a clinician would prefer it, and which turns out to be the more illuminating arrangement.

The jobWhat it meansExample
PredictingSpotting risk before anything has happenedGenetic risk scores; flagging high blood pressure two years early
DiagnosingWorking out what is wrong, and which kindEchoNet-Dynamic on heart ultrasound; sorting heart failure into subtypes
TreatingChoosing the drug and when to startMatching drugs to heart failure subtypes; how long to keep someone on blood thinners
ManagingWatching continuously instead of at appointmentsA chest patch flagging heart failure; follow-up over a messaging app

Those four run across blocked arteries, heart failure, atrial fibrillation and high blood pressure. And here is the habit that makes the paper worth an afternoon: each section builds its case with enthusiasm and then, in the closing paragraph, takes most of it back. The last paragraph is generally the honest one.

Insights from the BiB community
The line worth writing down

Steve walked the room through the results that make people sit forward in their chairs, and then drew a line the field blurs almost as a matter of habit. Helping a clinician read a trace more accurately is a real contribution and nobody should be sniffy about it. It is also an entirely different occupation from understanding what causes the disease, or from producing something new to prescribe. Conflating the two is how this field oversells itself, cheerfully and without noticing.

What goes in

Three kinds of data

  • Tidy. Hospital records, labs, cohorts like UK Biobank.
  • Messy. Scans, the free text a doctor types, wearable streams.
  • New. Genetics, blood chemistry, microbiome, where you live.

Three ways to combine them

  • Early. One long row, one model.
  • Middle. Each type gets a sub-model, merged inside the network.
  • Late. Separate models, then let them vote.

The finest technical writing in the paper concerns something almost aggressively unglamorous: agree the format while you are collecting the data, not in the hungover months afterwards. Skip that step and, as the authors put it with some restraint, "even technically advanced platforms can devolve into data silos."

Insights from the BiB community
Steve on the grand platform

The review closes its systems chapter with an architecture diagram of the kind that looks marvellous on a slide: every source of data feeds a single platform, and out the other end comes one clear instruction for the patient. Steve's verdict was that this is highly optimistic. It asks hospitals, companies and regulators to cooperate at a level the industry has never once managed.

His list of what stands in the way was less dramatic and considerably more convincing. No agreed standards between institutions. Records missing, and missing most reliably for the patients you most want to find. The same condition written down differently depending on who is holding the pen. And a catch with a certain bleak symmetry: the FDA and NIH set rules about who may join a study precisely in order to reduce bias, and those rules narrow who ends up in the data, which introduces a bias of a different shape. He was blunt that nobody has solved this, and that the field's answer so far has been to go and collect more data.

Three rungs

Nearly every claim in this paper rests on one of three rungs, and the distance between the rungs is the whole story. It is also considerably greater than the prose lets on.

Three tiers of evidence with large gaps between them
Every trial named here was checked against its own paper, not taken from the review.

Tier 1  The model does the maths well

The measure is AUC, a mark out of one for telling two groups apart, where 0.5 means the model is flipping a coin with some conviction. The great majority of the 260 studies live on this rung, and they live there comfortably.

AI-ECG for a failing pump
0.93
Zachi Attia and colleagues at Mayo, Nat Med 2019. Trained on 44,959 paired traces and scans, tested on 52,870 patients it had never seen.
EchoNet-Dynamic
4.1%
Average error estimating how much blood the heart pushes out per beat. David Ouyang's group, Nature 2020, from 10,030 ultrasound videos.
Plaque classification
97.6%
Accuracy, multicentre. The review prints this at face value with no appraisal, which is the pattern rather than the exception.

These are handsome results and there is no call to be grudging about them. The paper's own verdict on the rung, however, is delivered without ceremony: "relatively abundant technical validation but insufficient high-level clinical effectiveness evidence."

Tier 2  Doctors did something different

TARGET
Yang and colleagues, Circulation 2023. An angiogram threads a wire into your heart, and many turn out to be unnecessary. 1,216 patients randomised across six hospitals. With AI analysis guiding the decision, 69.2% went on to one instead of 79.4%.
EchoNet-RCT
Nature 2023. Sonographers and an AI each read heart ultrasounds first, blinded. The cardiologist then had to substantially correct 16.8% of the AI's readings against 27.2% of the humans'.
The review cites one of these and not the other. It cites Ouyang's paper of 2020 with evident approval, then spends its final third lamenting the absence of randomised trials, having somehow not mentioned the randomised trial the same group published in the same journal three years afterwards. Search the reference list for "sonographer" and the search returns nothing at all.

Tier 3  Patients were better off

BEAT-HF
Michael Ong and colleagues, JAMA Intern Med 2016. 1,437 patients. Teaching before discharge, nurse phone calls after, monitoring at home. Six months later, exactly as many had been readmitted.
Persell
JAMA Netw Open 2020. 333 patients. A coaching app against a plain tracker. Difference after six months: −2.0 mmHg, which given the margin of error is no reliable difference. The coaching group felt more confident. Their blood pressure did not care.
Five phrases from the paper, each with a one-line explanation
Three of these have already travelled into conversations with nothing to do with hearts.
Both cautionary trials are older than the thing they caution against. BEAT-HF ran on nurses with telephones and a set of bathroom scales. Persell recruited across 2016 and 2017. Neither tested anything remotely resembling the systems this review spends eight pages describing. The true claim is therefore narrower than the tone: simple remote monitoring did not move readmissions, and almost nothing modern has finished a trial that asks whether patients lived longer. The caution is well placed. The evidence pointing in that particular direction is thinner than the confidence of the writing.
Insights from the BiB community
Why the ladder looks like this in cardiology

Wang Xiang offered the comparison that explains the entire shape of the ladder. In cancer, a mutation picks the drug, so a model that finds the mutation walks you directly to a treatment decision. Cardiology enjoys very little of that convenience.

Comparison of AI in cancer against AI in heart disease across five dimensions
Tier 2 is thin here partly because there is less for a model's output to change.

The room divided on what follows from that. Should the effort go into better prediction, so that the treatments already on the shelf begin sooner? Or into the biology, so that there is eventually something new to prescribe? Most leaned towards prediction as the achievable near-term goal, with laboratory work continuing alongside. Nobody sounded entirely satisfied with that as the whole of the answer, and nobody should have been.

The 32% problem

There is one sentence in this review that performs, in miniature and with perfect innocence, the exact offence the review spends its final third warning against. It is the best teaching object in the paper.

The sentence reports that an AI study "demonstrated that AI-optimized revascularization strategies could improve outcomes by ~32%." Now go and read what Peyman Ghasemi and his colleagues actually published.

Three phrases from the source paper and how the review altered each one
Three words moved. Each move made the claim stronger than the evidence.

The study took the records of 41,328 patients and asked what a computer might have chosen in place of what the doctors chose, then scored that imaginary policy against what in fact became of the real patients. The method is entirely legitimate, the authors describe it with care, and they went to the trouble of constraining the computer to propose only things a working hospital could actually deliver.

But no one was treated by it. Not one person. The 32% is a score in a simulation.

Carry this to the session as a mirror rather than a weapon. Ten specialists, writing a paper whose entire thesis is that the field mistakes good scores for good outcomes, produced a sentence mistaking a good score for a good outcome. They were not careless. They were human, near a deadline, working quickly through material they knew well. If understanding the trap is insufficient protection against it, then reading faster is certainly not going to help.

Who is actually in the data?

The review never says. Not once, across some 68,500 characters. The words were counted rather than merely complained about, on the principle that a grievance with a number attached is harder to wave away.

Bar chart of how often words about bias and representation appear in the paper
"Disparities" does not appear. Neither does "low-income".

What the paper offers by way of remedy amounts to four sentences, tucked into the governance chapter. Data that fails to represent people "can systematically disadvantage women, racial or ethnic minorities, or resource-constrained populations," and therefore "bias assessment" ought to be embedded in governance. The diagnosis is correct. The prescription is a noun. It arrives with no measurement attached, no groups named, no threshold anybody must clear, and no mention of TRIPOD+AI, PROBAST+AI, CONSORT-AI or DECIDE-AI, which are the four checklists built for precisely this purpose and which somebody went to considerable trouble to write.

Named data sources by country, with four regions at zero
The one Latin American entry is ELSA-Brasil, inside a list of three.

A paper that opens by projecting 35.6 million deaths across the whole world turns out to rest on evidence gathered almost entirely in wealthy health systems, with China and Japan for company.

UK Biobank deserves its own note, partly because it is the most-used resource in the paper and partly because the usual complaint about it is slightly wrong. People observe that it is 94.6% white. So it is, and so was Britain at the time of recruitment, which rather blunts the point. The sharper difficulty is the question of who volunteers for a twenty-year medical study. Participants carry roughly half the death rate of the country they were drawn from, and they skew older, more often female and more comfortably off than the people who received the same letter and put it in the bin. The review leans on this cohort five separate times and mentions none of it.

The one real fix on offer

A polygenic risk score gathers thousands of small genetic differences into a single number. For years these worked admirably for Europeans and poorly for everybody else, for the unremarkable reason that Europeans were who had been studied. GPS-Mult, from Patel and colleagues in Nature Medicine 2023, was built to correct that, and it does beat every previous version in every ancestry group it was tested in.

The four ancestry groups GPS-Mult was validated in, with Europeans far larger
Real progress on a field that was almost entirely European a decade ago. Still lopsided.
What could not be checked. Whether GPS-Mult still performs measurably worse in the smaller groups. That is in the supplementary material and somebody should read it, because it decides whether this is a solved problem or a narrowed one.
Insights from the BiB community
The question the session kept returning to

Steve raised it against his own presentation, which is precisely why it landed. The standard answer to bias in medical AI is to go and collect more data. His worry is that if you do so without changing who the data comes from, what you build is a model that has learned the workings of a hospital. Who gets referred. Who gets tested. How a doctor phrases a note on a Thursday afternoon. Not the heart.

Christine Wilson agreed and then went considerably further. If you study only clinical data, she said, you are studying only those who already have access and have already consented, and everybody else remains invisible to you. Laboratory research has to run alongside the data work, in order to go and find out whether the patterns mean anything at all. She described the current position as "the first of many baby steps", which is both modest and accurate.

Four routes to reaching populations missing from medical datasets
The constructive half of the session, and the part the paper does not supply.

She also put a question that nobody quite answered: why has the personalised medicine that works so well in oncology never arrived in cardiology? Fiona Connolly offered that genotypic and expression-based roles in the progression of heart disease very probably exist, but are poorly defined, and that genetics plays a smaller hand here than it does in cancer. Christine's reply was that the shortage of research interest is itself the gap, and that the multimodal approaches under discussion are exactly how one would find out whether the investment is deserved.

One conflation is worth naming before leaving this section. The paper does take fairness seriously in exactly one place, which is digital health literacy, noting that some 13 million older adults in the United States may struggle with telemedicine at all, and proposing sensible remedies: design the thing with the people who will use it, keep a telephone option open, teach people. That is real content and it should not be waved away.

But it answers a different question. It concerns who can reach the treatment, not who was inside the data that built it. Two failures, two remedies, and the review treats solving the first as though it settles the second.

A model trained on UK Biobank and delivered flawlessly to a well-supported patient in Lagos has still never seen anybody remotely like her.

The strongest argument in the paper

Set aside everything that only ever reached the first rung and a single chain survives, with real evidence at every link along it. The review assembles this case and then, curiously, never quite commits to it, because it has organised itself by disease rather than by the strength of what it found.

A five-step chain from a CT scan to fewer deaths, with the final step drawn as a dashed missing link
Four solid links and one nobody has tested.

Three things make this chain sturdier than anything else in the paper. The scan is already being taken for another reason entirely, so the additional cost is close to nothing. What comes out of it lands on a drug decision that already has evidence behind it. And the machinery for converting a risk score into a prescription exists and works, which is not nothing.

Set that beside the heart failure chapter, where the review concedes that "most evidence for differential drug responses derives from post hoc analyses of retrospective data." Which is to say: somebody went back through the old records looking for patterns. A perfectly respectable way to generate a hypothesis. Not a way to prove one.

Say it this way. AI can read a scan and find people at real risk whose arteries look clear, which means guidelines currently cannot see them. There is already an approved drug for them. Nobody has run the trial showing this saves lives. That is a strong claim that needs no exaggeration.

The problem underneath all of this

Aditya Nanda presented second, on work of his own, and it appears at first to be a change of subject. It is nothing of the kind. Everything in the pages above depends on somebody, somewhere, being able to lay hands on patient data.

Measure how strongly each of a person's twenty thousand genes is switched on and you have produced something enormously useful and very nearly impossible to share. Roughly half of the relevant biomedical data sits locked away. An application for access consumes months. And the rare, mixed populations that translational work actually requires are, for the most part, not in the public collections at all.

Then came the part that visibly surprised the room. That table of numbers is not anonymous. A paper from 2012 demonstrated that you can work backwards from gene activity to a person's individual DNA variants, producing what its authors called a genetic barcode. Gene activity data has the appearance of a spreadsheet and the behaviour of a fingerprint.

The idea, and why the obvious tools fail

The proposal is to manufacture patients. Not invented from nothing, but computed so that the artificial group behaves like the real one in aggregate while no single record corresponds to a living person. Share the manufactured version freely and keep the original under lock. This is workable because most analysis has no interest in individuals, only in the patterns they collectively make.

Diagram comparing the tall narrow data shape standard tools need against the short wide shape of gene activity data
The mismatch is the whole reason a new method was needed.
The three tests applied to the synthetic data: fidelity, utility and privacy
Run across four patient groups: sepsis, two lung cancer tasks, and a bowel disease study.
Scorecard showing four methods rated on accuracy and on whether they used the right genes
The result worth carrying out of the session.

Two methods scored identically and were doing entirely different things. The same mark on the examination, quite different biology underneath. That is the finding worth carrying away: accuracy is a weak test of manufactured data, because a model may arrive at the right answer for altogether the wrong reasons.

Note also which method finished last. The most sophisticated one. Compressing twenty thousand genes into three hundred numbers and expanding them out again loses too much on the return journey. Sophistication was never the binding constraint. Information loss was.

Asked whether the method might rescue a very small trial, five responders and five non-responders and ten controls, he declined the invitation without hesitation. Every statistic in the manufactured data descends from the real data beneath it, so ten patients remain ten patients' worth of information however many rows one prints. There was a good deal on offer there for a man selling a method, and he did not take any of it.

Insights from the BiB community
What Aditya could not yet answer

Nobody has yet proved that one cannot work backwards from manufactured gene activity data to a real person's DNA. Until somebody does, this remains a convenience for researchers rather than a guarantee of privacy, and the distinction is not a small one.

Whether regulators would accept synthetic data in a submission is unclear. Performance drops for the smallest patient groups, often the ones you most want to study. And asked how the method handles a genetic variant when the variant is what you are predicting, he explained that in the lung cancer data the mutation status was already a separate clinical column rather than computed from expression. How you would generate that variation inside synthetic data is unanswered.

Nanda A, Saha S. Synthetic RNA-seq cohorts for data sharing: a discovery-aware benchmark at transcriptome scale. bioRxiv 2026.05.22.726357. Preprint · Code. Worth saying plainly: dbTwin, the best-performing method, is the corresponding author's own, and the benchmark and code are fully open, which is the right answer to that. Sage Bionetworks published comparable work this year.

Where it falls down, and where it doesn't

Falls down

  1. No method. No search strategy, no dates, no inclusion rules, no quality appraisal. With 260 references you cannot tell "the literature" from "what ten people found interesting."
  2. Accuracy figures pass through untouched, from studies of wildly different size and rigour, with no weighting.
  3. Nobody asks who was in the data.
  4. A significant randomised trial is missing from a section complaining about missing randomised trials.
  5. Both cautionary trials are older than the technology.
  6. An undeclared lens. Nine of the ten authors work in traditional Chinese medicine institutions, and a model reading tongue and pulse features sits alongside CT and MRI without comment. Not a flaw. Useful context for which examples got picked.

Doesn't

Insights from the BiB community
The same problem, one floor down

The session opened on a subject that appeared unrelated and was not. Matt McCormick reported slow progress recreating July's project, on account of only part of the original code having been published, which left him guessing at the steps in between. Fiona Connolly matched it with her own experience in protein engineering, where the binding sequences printed in a paper did not correspond to the data.

The group's diagnosis was deadline pressure compounded by tacit knowledge, which is the understanding a research team holds in common and never troubles to write down, because everybody in the room already has it. A review with no stated method and a paper missing half its code are the same failure wearing different clothes. What is absent from the record remains invisible until somebody sits down and tries to use it.

What the room left open

Data and biology
Are these models learning how disease works, or how the healthcare system works?
Alongside it: does genetic variation matter here the way it does in cancer, and has anyone properly looked?
What gets collected
Tailor collection per disease, or find one measurement that works broadly?
And should biobanks go deeper on fewer conditions rather than broader across everyone?
Who is represented
How do datasets come to reflect the actual population?
Can visible improvements for one community raise participation from it? Nobody could find a way to start that loop from standing.
Synthetic data
Can anyone prove real DNA cannot be recovered from synthetic gene activity data?
Until that exists it is a convenience, not a guarantee. Related: would regulators accept it, and is combining synthetic copies across institutions a real substitute for sharing?
Getting it to patients
When is a model of a patient accurate enough to act on?
And how should these tools navigate medical device approval, which most of them will need?
Left over from this guide
Nobody has opened Table S1.
The review's own summary of the randomised trials that do exist. It would settle how many hard-outcome trials there actually are, which is what the ladder turns on.

Words you will need

AUC
A mark out of one for how well a model tells two groups apart. 0.5 is guessing. It says nothing about whether the model's confidence is trustworthy.
Calibration
Whether "20% chance" actually happens 20% of the time. A model can score brilliantly on AUC and still be badly calibrated.
Surrogate endpoint
A stand-in for what you actually care about. AUC stands in for "the patient did better." The field keeps stopping at the stand-in.
Off-policy evaluation
Working out how a new decision rule would have performed, using records of what somebody else decided. Useful, and entirely hypothetical.
Randomised controlled trial
Split patients by chance, give one group the new thing. The randomness is what lets you say the new thing caused the difference.
Healthy volunteer effect
People who sign up for long studies are healthier than the population they came from. UK Biobank volunteers have roughly half the death rate of Britain.
Ejection fraction
The percentage of blood the heart's main chamber pushes out per beat. A low number means the pump is failing.
Angiogram
Threading a wire into the heart's arteries to see whether they are blocked. Informative, invasive, often unnecessary in hindsight.
Plaque
Fatty material building up in an artery wall. The soft kind is more dangerous than the hard calcified kind.
FFR-CT
Using a CT scan plus computation to work out whether a narrowing actually restricts blood flow, instead of measuring with a wire.
Fat attenuation index
A measure of inflammation in the fat around a coronary artery, read off a scan you already took. Finds risk in people whose arteries look fine.
Polygenic risk score
Thousands of tiny genetic differences added into one number estimating inherited risk. Historically worked well for Europeans and poorly for everyone else.
HFpEF
Heart failure where the heart pumps normally by the usual measure but fills badly. Very varied between patients and poorly served by existing drugs.
MACE
Major adverse cardiovascular events. A bundle of bad outcomes counted together. The exact recipe changes between trials.
Atrial fibrillation
An irregular heart rhythm that raises stroke risk. Often silent, which is why smartwatches keep finding it.
Dataset shift
The data changes after you deploy. New scanner, new coding habits, different patients. Models decay quietly rather than failing loudly.
Federated learning
Training one model across several hospitals by passing the model around instead of the records. This does not make it automatically private.
Differential privacy
Adding measured noise so nobody can tell whether any one person was in the dataset. You buy the guarantee with accuracy.
FHIR and OMOP-CDM
Two standards. FHIR moves health data between systems. OMOP-CDM stores it in a shared shape so the same code runs everywhere.
Alert fatigue
Bury a clinician in low-value notifications and they start dismissing all of them, including the one that mattered.

How this was checked

Two sources, different standards, kept visually apart. Purple blocks carry insights from the BiB community, as recorded in the notes taken on the day. Everything else comes from the paper or the primary studies behind it, each checked against the original rather than against the review: BEAT-HF, Persell, Ghasemi, TARGET, SCOT-HEART, ORFAN, Attia, both EchoNet papers, the 2050 projection and its missing qualifier, PREVENT, UK Biobank's volunteer statistics, GPS-Mult, and the four reporting checklists. The word counts and country counts were computed from the text of the PDF.

Three things stayed unverified. Whether GPS-Mult still underperforms in smaller ancestry groups. The quality of the two plaque accuracy figures, quoted only to show the review passes them through unexamined. And the China count in the geography chart is deliberately conservative, because several single-centre Chinese studies resist clean counting.

And Table S1, which nobody has yet opened. It would settle the question this whole guide turns on. Time ran out.